



BETWEEN TEXT AND LAW: HASAN AL-TURABĪ'S INTERPRETATION OF *DILĀLAH LAFẒ AL-AḤKĀM* IN MARITAL PROHIBITION VERSES

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ABSTRACT

This study offers a critical analysis of the *Dilālah Lafẓ 'alā al-Aḥkām* method (verbal indication of legal rulings) as conceptualized by Ḥasan al-Turābī, with particular emphasis on his interpretive approach to Qur'anic injunctions concerning prohibited forms of marriage. Employing a qualitative, library-based research methodology, this paper adopts a descriptive-analytical framework and draws primarily from *al-Tafsīr al-Tawḥīdī* as the central textual source. The theoretical underpinning is grounded in the framework of *manṭūq* and *mafḥūm*—a methodological apparatus developed by Khālid Ibn 'Uthmān al-Sabt for legal hermeneutics within the *Dilālah Lafẓ* tradition. The analysis proceeds by identifying and cataloguing relevant Qur'anic verses addressing prohibited marriages, explicating al-Turābī's hermeneutical approach, and subsequently assessing it through the lens of *manṭūq* and *mafḥūm* theory. The findings suggest that al-Turābī's interpretative method is consistent with the analytical strategies of the *Mutakallimīn* school, especially in his reliance on explicit (*manṭūq*) and implicit (*mafḥūm*) textual meanings to derive legal rulings.

Keywords: *Dilalah Lafẓ*, Ḥasan al-Turābī, Prohibited Marriage, *al-Tafsīr al-Tawḥīdī*

ABSTRAK

Studi ini menyajikan analisis kritis terhadap metode *Dilālah Lafẓ 'alā al-Aḥkām* (petunjuk lafaz terhadap hukum) sebagaimana dikembangkan oleh Ḥasan al-Turābī, dengan fokus khusus pada pendekatannya dalam memahami ayat-ayat Al-Qur'an mengenai larangan pernikahan. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif berbasis kepustakaan (library research), dengan pendekatan deskriptif-analitis dan sumber utama berupa *al-Tafsīr al-Tawḥīdī*. Kerangka teoritis yang digunakan adalah teori *manṭūq* dan *mafḥūm*, yaitu salah satu pendekatan dalam *Dilālah Lafẓ* yang dirumuskan oleh Khālid Ibn 'Uthmān al-Sabt dalam mengekstraksi hukum-hukum syar'i. Analisis dimulai dengan mengumpulkan ayat-ayat yang berkaitan dengan larangan pernikahan, kemudian menguraikan pemikiran al-Turābī dalam menafsirkan dan menggali hukum dari ayat-ayat tersebut. Selanjutnya, pemikiran tersebut dianalisis melalui pendekatan *manṭūq* dan *mafḥūm*, yang pada akhirnya menghasilkan kesimpulan bahwa metode yang digunakan al-Turābī dalam menganalisis ayat-ayat larangan pernikahan sejalan dengan pendekatan sekolah *Mutakallimīn*, khususnya dalam penggunaan makna eksplisit (*manṭūq*) dan implisit (*mafḥūm*) dalam penetapan hukum.

Kata Kunci: Ḥasan al-Turābī, Pernikahan Terlarang, *al-Tafsīr al-Tawḥīdī*



INTRODUCTION

The process of *istinbāṭ*, or the derivation of legal rulings from primary Islamic sources through *ijtihād*, remains a foundational pillar of contemporary Islamic legal discourse. As societies evolve and encounter novel sociocultural and political challenges, the imperative to contextualize and adapt Islamic law becomes increasingly vital. This dynamic interpretative capacity ensures that the *Shari'ah*—which encompasses creed, worship, interpersonal transactions, criminal justice, and other dimensions of human conduct—retains its relevance and responsiveness to the exigencies of the modern world. Through the application of *ijtihād*, *istinbāṭ* not only provides solutions to emerging legal issues but also unveils new dimensions of jurisprudential understanding, as emphasized by Syaltut (Syaltut, n.d., p. 12).

One of the most contested issues in modern Islamic jurisprudence is interfaith marriage. This subject encapsulates the tension between preserving classical interpretations and responding to contemporary realities marked by globalization, religious pluralism, and increasing interfaith social interaction. A frequently cited verse in this discourse is Qur'ān 5:5, which has historically served as the textual basis for permitting Muslim men to marry women from among the *Ahl al-Kitāb* (People of the Book). Its interpretive significance lies in the divergent readings it has elicited—ranging from restrictive to permissive—across various schools of law and exegetical traditions:

“This day [all] good foods have been made lawful, and the food of those who were given the Scripture is lawful for you and your food is lawful for them. And [lawful in marriage are] chaste women from among the believers and chaste women from among those who were given the Scripture before you—when you have given them their due compensation, desiring chastity, not unlawful sexual intercourse or taking them as lovers. And whoever denies the faith—his work has

become worthless, and he, in the Hereafter, will be among the losers.” (Pentashihan and Al-Qur'an, n.d., p. 152)

Classical jurists, including representatives of the Ḥanafī and Shāfi'ī schools, largely interpreted this verse as permitting such marriages under specific conditions. Nevertheless, other scholars expressed caution, particularly in sociopolitical contexts where interfaith unions might compromise communal identity or legal sovereignty. In the modern era, scholarly opinion remains divided. While some uphold the classical permissibility, others contest its relevance within contemporary frameworks where interfaith marriage may conflict with core Islamic values or risk religious dilution. These disagreements reflect deeper methodological divergences in *istinbāṭ*, spanning from literalist hermeneutics to historically and contextually grounded legal reasoning.

Notably, prominent exegetes such as al-Zamakhsharī, al-Qurṭubī (Abī Bakr al-Qurṭubī, 2016, 7:320), al-Ṭabarī (Ṭabarī, n.d., 9:589), and al-Qāsimī (Qāsimī, n.d., p. 1871) unanimously affirmed the permissibility of Muslim men marrying women from the People of the Book—but not the inverse. By contrast, Hasan al-Turābī, a leading contemporary intellectual, diverges from this traditional stance. He contends that both Muslim men and women may enter into interfaith marriages with People of the Book (Turābī, 1432, 2:333). In his framework, the term *Ahl al-Kitāb* denotes free Jewish and Christian women who accept the Torah and Gospel as divine revelations inherited from the lineage of the Children of Israel (Danil, 2019).

This divergence in opinion arises from the application of differing interpretive methodologies within the broader field of *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Hasan al-Turābī's approach is emblematic of a reformist paradigm rooted in

modern *uṣūl al-fiqh*, as opposed to classical juridical constructs (Jamaluddin, 2017). In his seminal work *Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Islāmī*, Turābī advocates for a systematic rethinking of traditional legal theory. He posits that reliance on classical *uṣūl al-fiqh* alone is insufficient for addressing the complexities of the contemporary age, as those methodologies were historically contingent and tailored to the legal concerns of their time (Turābī, 1432, 2:36).

Accordingly, this study aims to critically assess Hasan al-Turābī's application of modern *uṣūl al-fiqh* to Qur'ānic legal interpretation, with a particular focus on the case of interfaith marriage. It seeks to evaluate how his theory of *istinbāṭ* redefines or challenges established jurisprudential boundaries and contributes to ongoing debates on Islamic legal reform.

A number of scholarly works have examined Turābī's *Tafsīr al-Tawḥīdī* and its significance within modern Qur'ānic exegesis. For instance, Abdul Karim emphasizes Turābī's rationalist methodology, which incorporates a thematic reading of *sūrah*s, intertextual coherence, and the identification of macro-principles to address contemporary issues (Karim, n.d.). Muhammad Makmun Abha offers a critical perspective, arguing that Turābī's *tawḥīdī* framework lacks intellectual originality and largely mirrors the thematic methods of earlier exegetes such as Muḥammad Maḥmūd al-Ḥijāzī (Abha, 2014). Meanwhile, Esam Eltigani Mohamed Ibrahim and Ibrahim M. Zein highlight Turābī's reformist orientation, situating his work within the broader currents of modern *ta'wīl* and underscoring its role in advancing Islamic renewal and political development (Ibrahim & Zein, 2014).

Although these studies offer valuable insights into the general features of *Tafsīr al-*

Tawḥīdī, few have explored the deeper jurisprudential implications of Turābī's methodology within the framework of *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *istinbāṭ*. This paper fills that lacuna by analyzing his interpretive strategies through the prism of interfaith marriage, thereby contributing to contemporary scholarly discourse on Qur'ānic legal hermeneutics.

RESEARCH METHODS

The *methodology of the Mutakallimīn*—those theologians deeply engaged in dialectical reasoning within Islamic theology and jurisprudence—relies fundamentally on rational deduction rooted in divine revelation. Their theological discourse centers around the Qur'ān, regarded as the eternal speech of Allah. Scholars from the Mālikī, Shāfi'ī, and Ḥanbalī traditions prominently feature within this school of thought (Elpipit and Saputra, 2022). According to the Mutakallimīn, the *verbal indications (dalālah al-laḥẓ)* of legal rulings are divided into two principal categories: *mantūq* (explicit meaning) and *mafhūm* (implicit meaning) (al-Khīn, n.d., p. 135).

Definition of Mantūq

The term *mantūq* is derived from the Arabic root *نطق* (naṭaqa), meaning “to articulate” or “to pronounce” (Maḍūr and Ibn Mukrim, 1996, p. 354). In technical usage, *mantūq* refers to that which is directly expressed in spoken language—specifically, a legal ruling that corresponds to the actual utterance, regardless of whether the ruling is stated explicitly or implied contextually (al-Khīn, n.d., p. 138). Consider the following Qur'ānic verse:

فَلَا تَقُلْ لَهُمَا أَفٍ

“So do not say to them [your parents] a word of contempt.” (Qur'ān).

Analyzed through the lens of *mantūq*, the verse indicates a direct prohibition against

even the mildest expression of annoyance toward one's parents.

Another example:

وَرَبَائِبُكُمُ اللَّاتِي فِي حُجُورِكُم مِّن نِّسَائِكُم
اللَّاتِي دَخَلْتُم بِهِنَّ

"Your stepdaughters under your guardianship [born] of your wives unto whom you have gone in..." (Qur'an).

A *mantūq*-based interpretation of this verse denotes a prohibition against marrying one's stepdaughters under specific conditions—an injunction derivable from the explicit linguistic construction of the verse.

Classical jurists in *uṣūl al-fiqh* classify *mantūq* into two distinct types: *mantūq ṣarīḥ* (unequivocal expression) and *mantūq ghayr ṣarīḥ* (non-explicit expression) (al-Khīn, n.d., p. 139).

***Mantūq Ṣarīḥ* (Explicit Indication)**

This refers to the direct and unambiguous meaning conveyed by the text. For instance, the verse:

وَأَحَلَّ اللَّهُ الْبَيْعَ وَحَرَّمَ الرِّبَا
"Allah has permitted trade and prohibited interest." (Qur'an).

Here, the verse unmistakably authorizes commercial trade and prohibits usury, as explicitly indicated by the syntax.

***Mantūq Ghayr Ṣarīḥ* (Implicit Indication)**

In contrast, *mantūq ghayr ṣarīḥ* refers to meanings not immediately deduced from the explicit language but inferred through entailment (*iltizām*), rather than direct correspondence (*mutabaqah*) or inclusion (*taḍammun*). For example:

وَعَلَى الْمَوْلُودِ لَهُ رِزْقُهُنَّ وَكِسْوَتُهُنَّ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ
"Upon the father is the mothers' provision and clothing according to what is acceptable." (Qur'an).

A *mantūq ghayr ṣarīḥ* analysis infers that lineage is established through the father and that he bears the financial responsibility for the child. Though not explicitly stated, these legal implications are necessitated by the structure and intent of the verse (Maftūḥah, 2025, p. 145).

Mantūq ghayr ṣarīḥ is traditionally subdivided into three forms of derived indication: *Dalālah al-Iqtidā'*, *Dalālah al-Imā'*, and *Dalālah al-Ishārah*.

Most scholars of *uṣūl al-fiqh* classify *Mantūq Ghayr Ṣarīḥ*—that is, non-explicit verbal indications—into three principal categories. The first is *Dilālah al-Iqtidhā'*, which refers to a form of verbal indication wherein a statement inherently requires supplementation in order to preserve its coherence with reason or Shari'ah principles, without necessitating a pause for contemplation to extract its legal purport (al-Khin, n.d., p. 140). This view is widely accepted by the majority of scholars, with the notable exception of Ibn Ḥazm.

A classic example is derived from the Qur'anic verse:

فَمَنْ كَانَ مِنْكُمْ مَّرِيضًا أَوْ عَلَى سَفَرٍ فَعِدَّةٌ مِّنْ أَيَّامٍ أُخَرَ

"So whoever among you is ill or on a journey [during them]—then an equal number of days [are to be made up]." (Qur'an)

A literal reading of this verse would render the directive unintelligible: how could the sick or the traveler be required to "make up days" if no act of breaking the fast has been stated? Thus, according to the principles of *Dilālah al-Iqtidhā'*, it becomes necessary to infer the phrase "فَأَقْطَرَ" ("and then breaks the fast") so that the statement aligns both logically and theologically: "So whoever among you is ill or on a journey and breaks

the fast, then he must make up [the same number of] days."

This interpretative addition establishes a condition—that only those who interrupt their fast due to illness or travel are obligated to compensate for the missed days. If they fast despite their condition, then no recompense is due, a conclusion unanimously upheld by jurists.

The second category, *Dilalah al-Ima'*, denotes a verbal indication that conveys legal meaning through an accompanying rational justification (*'illah*), without necessitating linguistic supplementation or interpretive pause. An illustrative example is found in the Hadith wherein an Arab man confessed: "I have had sexual intercourse with my wife during the daytime in *Ramaḍān*" (al-Bukhārī and Ibn Ibrāhīm, 2006, p. 767), to which the Prophet ﷺ responded: "Free a slave."

The Prophet's response implicitly links the act of expiation (freeing a slave) with the preceding violation (intercourse during fasting hours). Thus, the legal consequence is derived from the implied reasoning, as if the man had said: "I committed this act, therefore I am obligated to atone by emancipating a slave." The indication is embedded in the structure of the narrative, not explicitly stated.

Another example of *Dilalah al-Ima'* is embedded in the verse:

وَالسَّارِقُ وَالسَّارِقَةُ فَاقْطَعُوا أَيْدِيَهُمَا جَزَاءً
بِمَا كَسَبَا نَكَالًا مِنَ اللَّهِ وَاللَّهُ عَزِيزٌ حَكِيمٌ

"As for the thief, male or female, amputate their hands in retribution for what they have earned, as a deterrent from Allah. And Allah is Almighty, Wise." (Qur'an)

Here, the legal ruling (amputation) is inseparably tied to the crime (theft). If theft were not the causal factor, the directive would lack coherence, highlighting how *'illah* operates within this framework.

The third category, *Dilalah al-Isyarah*, refers to implicit indications that are not part of the speaker's intended meaning but nonetheless yield legal consequences through necessary inference (al-Khin, n.d., p. 140). Consider the following verses:

وَحَمْلُهُ وَفِصَالُهُ ثَلَاثُونَ شَهْرًا

"And his gestation and weaning [period] is thirty months."

وَفِصَالُهُ فِي عَامَيْنِ

"And weaning [period] is two years." (Qur'an)

By juxtaposing the total duration (30 months) with the weaning period (24 months), one can infer that the minimum duration of pregnancy is six months. This conclusion, though not explicitly stated, was accepted as valid legal reasoning during the caliphate of 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān when adjudicating a case involving a woman who gave birth after six months of pregnancy. Here, *Dilalah al-Isyarah* facilitates a legal ruling that was not the verse's direct intent.

A further application of this principle is evident in the Hadith:

"ما رأيت من ناقصات عقل ودين أذهب

لب الرجل الحازم من إحداكن...."

"I have not seen anyone more deficient in intellect and religion who can dominate the mind of a resolute man more than one of you [women]."

While the apparent purpose of this Hadith is to describe the spiritual and intellectual condition of women, Imām al-Āmidī employs *Dilalah al-Isyarah* to derive a jurisprudential rule: namely, that the maximum duration of menstruation (*ḥayḍ*) is fifteen days, and the minimum period of ritual purity (*ṭuhr*) is also fifteen days.

In his work *al-Iḥkām fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām*, al-Āmidī explains: "The third category is *Dilalah al-Isyarah*, as illustrated by the Prophet's statement: 'Women are deficient in intellect and religion.' Upon

being asked about this deficiency, the Prophet replied: 'She refrains from prayer and fasting for half the month.'" (al-Āmidī, 2003, pp. 82–83; Yazīd al-Qazwīnī, 1327).

Although the Hadith aims to describe a perceived shortcoming, its language indirectly implies a legal standard—since “half the month” corresponds to fifteen days, one may deduce the maximum length of menstruation and the minimum length of purity.

To conclude, the concept of *Mantūq*—that is, verbal indication in Islamic legal theory—can be systematically categorized into four distinct types, each with its own interpretive framework. The first is *Dilālah al-Mantūq al-Ṣarīḥ*, which represents explicit and direct expressions where the legal meaning is clearly articulated in the text. The second, *Dilālah al-Iqtidhā'*, refers to necessitated indications, where the text implicitly demands an additional understanding in order to maintain logical or religious coherence. The third, *Dilālah al-Imā'*, involves indicative reasoning, where a legal implication is derived from a word or phrase that hints at the underlying cause or rationale (*ʿillah*) behind a ruling. Lastly, *Dilālah al-Iyārah* encompasses allusive indications—meanings that are not directly intended by the speaker but are logically inferred from the structure or implications of the text.

Together, these categories illustrate the depth and precision of Islamic jurisprudential methodology, demonstrating how legal rulings are not solely drawn from what is said explicitly, but also from what is implied, necessitated, or even subtly alluded to within the divine texts.

Definition of *Maḥḥūm*

The term *Maḥḥūm* is derived from the Arabic root *فهم* (*fabima*), signifying “understanding.” In the context of *usūl al-fiqh* (Islamic legal theory), *Maḥḥūm* refers to the

inferred or implicit meaning of a statement—one that is not overtly articulated in the phrasing itself. The extraction of this implicit meaning often relies on an evaluative analysis of the lexical hierarchy of terms within the original language, enabling jurists to derive legal rulings without resorting to extensive *ijtihād* (independent reasoning).

A notable example can be drawn from a Qur'anic verse that states:

“So do not say to them ‘uff’ and do not repel them, but speak to them a noble word.” (Qur'an)

A direct analysis based on *Mantūq* (explicit meaning) would lead to a prohibition against uttering even a minor expression of annoyance, such as “uff.” However, the *Maḥḥūm* approach entails a deeper linguistic and contextual interpretation. By recognizing that “uff” represents a minimal act of disrespect, one may infer that more severe acts—such as striking one's parents—are, by implication, even more impermissible. This extrapolative understanding arises from the hierarchical ranking of expressions in Arabic rhetoric, wherein “striking” is of a higher intensity than “uff,” and thus the prohibition necessarily extends to it.

In the classical tradition of *usūl al-fiqh*, scholars have long recognized that the meanings embedded in religious texts extend beyond what is plainly stated. One of the central mechanisms for uncovering such implicit meaning is the concept of *Maḥḥūm*, which jurists generally divide into two principal categories: *Maḥḥūm al-Muwāfaqah* and *Maḥḥūm al-Mukhālafah*.

The first, *Maḥḥūm al-Muwāfaqah*, refers to an implied meaning that accords with and reinforces the explicit message of the text—what is known as *Mantūq*. Its operation rests on the intuitive hierarchy of linguistic expression: if a lesser act is explicitly prohibited, then logically, a more severe act falling within the same moral domain is also impermissible. For example, in the Qur'anic

injunction forbidding one from saying even a word of annoyance—such as “uff”—to one’s parents, jurists employing *Mafhūm al-Muwāfaqah* reason that more egregious behaviors, like physical aggression, are all the more forbidden. Because the inferred ruling carries equal or greater legal weight than the stated one, this form of inference is sometimes labeled *Lahn al-Khitāb*, emphasizing the subtleties embedded in divine speech that do not require complex *ijtihad* to discern.

In contrast, *Mafhūm al-Mukhālafah* operates on a different interpretive logic. Rather than aligning with the explicit text, it draws meaning from what is left unsaid—specifically, from conditions or qualifiers that imply an opposite ruling when absent. This method, also referred to as *Dalil al-Khitāb*, interprets silence as intentional exclusion. A case in point is the Qur’anic verse which states that if a man cannot afford to marry a free believing woman, he may then marry a believing slave woman. The presence of this conditional clause implies that if one does possess the means to marry a free woman, then marrying a slave woman is not permissible. Here, the implied legal ruling diverges from—and indeed contrasts with—the one stated in the text, thus illustrating the reverse logic at the heart of *Mafhūm al-Mukhālafah*.

Taken together, these two branches of *Mafhūm* reflect the intellectual depth of Islamic legal theory. They exemplify how jurists have historically engaged with scripture not merely by parsing its literal terms, but by attentively examining its structure, conditions, and silences. Such interpretive rigor highlights the sophistication of *usūl al-fiqh* as a discipline, demonstrating its capacity to derive comprehensive legal and ethical guidance from the layered nuances of sacred language.

Conditions Governing the Validity of *Mafhūm Mukhālafah* in Islamic Legal Reasoning

The application of *Mafhūm Mukhālafah*—an exegetical method that extrapolates legal meaning from what is omitted or left unsaid in a text—is subject to several stringent conditions, as unanimously recognized by classical and contemporary Islamic jurists. These conditions are imperative to safeguard the integrity and legitimacy of this interpretive approach within the broader framework of *usūl al-fiqh* (principles of Islamic jurisprudence).

First and foremost, any legal inference drawn from *Mafhūm Mukhālafah* must not contravene the explicit meaning (*Mantūq*) of the text. The *Mantūq*, by virtue of its direct articulation, carries superior evidentiary weight and epistemic clarity. For instance, the Qur’anic injunction on *qīṣāṣ* (equitable retaliation) in cases of murder makes no distinction based on gender, thereby establishing its universality. To claim—based on *Mafhūm Mukhālafah*—that this ruling excludes female victims would constitute a clear contradiction of the unambiguous text and would be categorically invalid.

Second, the ruling established through *Mantūq* must be intrinsically self-sufficient and not contingent upon extraneous conditions. Consider the Qur’anic verse: “And do not approach them (your wives) while you are in retreat in the mosques” (Qur’an 2:187). The *Mantūq* of this verse unequivocally forbids conjugal relations during the spiritual practice of *i’tikāf* within the mosque. To infer—through *Mafhūm Mukhālafah*—that such relations would be permissible outside the mosque during *i’tikāf* is a flawed interpretation, as the prohibition pertains to the sanctity of the retreat itself, not the spatial context.

Finally, the application of *Mafhūm Mukhālafah* must remain faithful to the

normative intent, linguistic structure, and socio-historical context of the scriptural source. For example, the verse “*O you who have believed, do not consume usury, doubled and multiplied*” (Qur’an 3:130) addresses the exploitative financial practices prevalent in pre-Islamic Arabia. To deduce that lesser forms of interest are permissible on the basis that only “doubled and multiplied” usury is explicitly condemned would be a misreading of the verse. This phrase is descriptive, not restrictive, and the broader legal tradition affirms the absolute prohibition of all forms of usury (*ribā*) irrespective of magnitude (Djalaluddin, 2016).

In sum, *Maḥbūm Mukhālafah* can serve as a valid instrument of legal inference only when it operates within the boundaries defined by explicit textual meaning, contextual coherence, and the objectives of the Shari‘ah.

RESULTS

Surah al-Baqarah (2:221)

“Do not marry polytheistic women until they believe, for a believing slave woman is better than a polytheist, even though she may please you. Nor shall you give your women in marriage to polytheistic men until they believe, for a believing slave is better than a polytheist, even though he may please you. They invite you to the Fire, but Allah invites to Paradise and forgiveness, by His will. And He makes His signs clear to the people, so that they may take heed.”

Hasan al-Turabī contextualizes this verse within the enduring legacy of pre-Islamic Arabian marital customs, which were often governed by tribal affiliations rather than religious convictions (Maram 2023). In Medina, these customs persisted into the early Muslim community, resulting in interfaith marriages that blurred the boundaries of Islamic monotheism within the family unit. Such unions frequently led to theological and social discord within households and lineage structures. Accordingly, this verse serves as a direct

injunction against perpetuating marital alliances based solely on tribal or ancestral loyalty without due regard for the faith commitment of the individuals involved.

Al-Turabī further elucidates the phrase “*a believing slave woman is better than a polytheist*” as a categorical prioritization of religious faith over social status, beauty, or material wealth. The command underscores that the spiritual integrity of a believing slave woman outweighs the allure or socio-economic superiority of a polytheistic freewoman. The underlying theological rationale is the preservation of faith within the family nucleus. According to al-Turabī, this instruction reflects a broader normative objective within early Islamic reform: to dismantle the residual tribal and kinship loyalties of the *jāhiliyah* (pre-Islamic ignorance) and replace them with loyalty to God and His revealed religion (Maram 2023).

The prohibition, therefore, is fundamentally rooted in the dichotomy between *īmān* (faith) and *shirk* (polytheism). While polytheists adhere to inherited deities and customs devoid of divine guidance, believers uphold monotheism grounded in revelation. This epistemological and spiritual divergence renders the union between a believer and a polytheist not only incompatible but potentially detrimental to the religious sanctity of the family (Ilyas 2008, 239).

Surah al-Mā'idah (5:5)

“Today, [lawful for you] are chaste women from among the believers and chaste women from among those who were given the Scripture before you, when you give them their due compensation, desiring chastity—not unlawful sexual intercourse or taking them as lovers. And whoever denies the faith—his deeds are rendered void, and in the Hereafter he will be among the losers.”

This verse establishes a conditional permissibility for Muslim men to marry chaste women from among both the

believers and the *Ahl al-Kitāb* (People of the Book—namely Jews and Christians), contingent upon the provision of the prescribed bridal gift (*mahr*) and the sincere intention to pursue a lawful and chaste union. It explicitly prohibits unions driven by lust, exploitation, or clandestine relationships. Furthermore, the verse warns that apostasy nullifies one's good deeds and leads to ultimate loss in the Hereafter (Maram 2023, 333).

Al-Turabī underscores that the overarching objective of this verse is the sanctification of the marital bond, not merely its legal permissibility. He stresses that marriage, in the Islamic framework, must be anchored in chastity, mutual respect, and spiritual harmony. Hence, the verse does not serve as a *carte blanche* for interfaith marriage, but rather as a qualified allowance grounded in the imperative to uphold virtue and avoid moral corruption (Nashrudin, n.d.).

DISCUSSION

In his interpretation of Qur'anic injunctions regarding interfaith marriage, Hasan al-Turabi places pronounced emphasis on *Mantūq* analysis, privileging the explicit, linguistically manifest meanings of the text. While this methodological commitment affirms the normative clarity and authority of divine revelation, it simultaneously reveals certain tensions and limitations when subjected to the scrutiny of broader Islamic legal theory. Turabi's reliance on *Mantūq*—particularly as interpreted through *Dilālah al-Iqtidhā'*, which posits that certain unstated implications must be assumed for the text to yield coherent legal meaning—leads him to identify *shirk* (polytheism) as the operative and definitive *'illah* (causative rationale) behind the prohibition of interfaith marriage. Accordingly, he argues that the absence of

this attribute would render such unions permissible. However, this line of reasoning risks essentializing polytheism, abstracting it from the multifaceted ethical, sociological, and jurisprudential considerations that classical jurists meticulously engaged.

By focusing almost exclusively on the apparent, denotative dimension of the text, Turabi underutilizes the rich interpretive frameworks embedded in *Maḥbūm*, especially *Maḥbūm al-Mumāfaqah* (a fortiori inference) and *Maḥbūm al-Mukhālafah* (argument from silence or contrast). These tools enable jurists to engage the text analogically or conditionally, extending the reach of legal reasoning beyond mere textual literalism. In Turabi's analysis, however, *Maḥbūm* functions in a supplementary and confirmatory capacity—invoked solely to validate conclusions already reached via *Mantūq*—rather than as a substantive mode of legal reasoning in its own right. Such an approach stands in contrast to the methodological pluralism of the Mālikī school, which historically embraced *maṣlaḥah mursalah* (unrestricted public interest) and *'amal ahl al-Madinah* (the normative practice of the people of Medina) as integral components of legal deliberation, especially in domains such as marriage, where societal norms and communal stability are deeply implicated.

Moreover, while the Shāfi'ī school is renowned for its rigorous linguistic exactitude, it does not categorically reject *Maḥbūm al-Mukhālafah* and, when relevant conditions are met, deploys it meaningfully. Turabi's reluctance to engage this interpretive method fully, therefore, might be viewed—particularly by Shāfi'ī jurists—as a missed opportunity for a more nuanced legal hermeneutic (cf. al-Khin, n.d.). Even the Zāhirī school, which is uncompromising in its textual literalism, maintains a principled rejection of *Maḥbūm*—a stance that Turabi

himself does not consistently adopt. This methodological inconsistency renders Turabi's approach epistemologically unstable, occupying a liminal space between literalism and analogical reasoning, between traditional orthodoxy and reformist hermeneutics.

Classical jurisprudence on interfaith marriage demonstrates a more calibrated and socially responsive stance. All four Sunni madhāhib permitted Muslim men to marry chaste women from the People of the Book, subject to conditions aimed at preserving communal welfare, religious identity, and social harmony. Similarly, the proscription against Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men was not premised solely on theological incompatibility or the presence of *shirk*, but rather rested on a constellation of concerns, including guardianship rights, the safeguarding of religious autonomy, and the cohesion of the family unit. Turabi's interpretation, by foregrounding theological incongruity as the singular rationale, thus risks flattening these complex layers of jurisprudential reasoning.

In sum, while Turabi's exegetical approach seeks moral clarity by anchoring legal norms in the unequivocal semantics of the Qur'anic text (Turabi 1432, 2:333), it does so at the cost of methodological breadth and interpretive flexibility. His reading constrains legal deliberation within a hermeneutic of linguistic certainty that inadequately accounts for the dynamism of lived social realities, the heterogeneity of juristic reasoning, and the depth of the Islamic legal heritage. Absent a more integrated engagement with both *Mantūq* and *Mafhūm*, and a deeper alignment with juristic precedent and socio-legal context, Turabi's framework risks reducing the rich tradition of Islamic legal hermeneutics to a reductive textualism.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, Hasan al-Turabi's interpretation of interfaith marriage in the light of Qur'anic injunctions underscores a pronounced fidelity to the principle of *Mantūq*, privileging the explicit textual meaning as the cornerstone of legal deliberation. While this approach offers a commendable degree of doctrinal precision, it inadvertently curtails the interpretive breadth by sidelining essential hermeneutical tools such as *Mafhūm al-Muwāfaqah* and *Mafhūm al-Mukhālafah*—long-standing instruments of analogical reasoning within the Islamic legal tradition. Such a methodological narrowing risks impoverishing the legal discourse, rendering it less responsive to the complex ethical, sociocultural, and historical dimensions that classical jurists—particularly those of the Mālikī and Shāfi'ī schools—diligently engaged with.

To uphold the integrity of Islamic legal methodology, it is imperative to transcend reductive literalism by adopting a more expansive interpretive framework. This necessitates the integration of diverse juristic tools that enable the dynamic application of legal principles to contemporary social realities. Although Turabi's reading is rooted in reformist aspirations and commendable moral clarity, it would be significantly enriched by a deeper engagement with juristic precedents, contextual analysis, and the plurality of interpretive strategies sanctioned by the tradition. Only through such a balanced and holistic approach can the Qur'anic vision of interfaith relations be meaningfully realized in the modern context.

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